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STATEMENT Of QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
WAS THE CROSS-APPEAL JURISDICTiONALLY DEFECTIVE? 
DOES ANY PRIOR DECISION IN THE HISTORY QF THIS COURT PERMIT 
A JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE CROSS-APPEAL? 
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OPINIONS ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
1. Lanaston v. McQuarrie. 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. App. August 25, 
1987) 
2. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Remittitur, October 6, 
1987. 
2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals regarding this; case is published in 64 
Utah Advance Reports 42. This opinion was rendered oh August 25, 1987. A 
copy is in the Appendix. 
A Petition for Rehearing was filed on September 4, 1987. The Petition was 
denied by the Court of Appeals on October 6, 1987. 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari comes before this Court in compliance 
with Rules 42 and 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The case presents 
issues relating to: 
1. The relationship of the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
2. The effect of a preliminary motion decision^ on the eventual 
disposition of an appeal. 
3. The jurisdictional nature of the requirement of timely filing of a cross-
appeal. 
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STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Brigf Summary of Facts 
This action was brought by a cattle rancher to remove documents from the 
public records which clouded his title. The Rancher Langston executed an 
Earnest Money Agreement Receipt, in early 1980, pursuant to which various other 
documents were later executed in what purported to be a "closing". These 
documents were recorded and even though the purchaser (McQuarrie) never 
took possession of the cattle ranch and cattle, and wrote a note saying he was 
"pulling out of the dear the documents constituted a cloud upon the title of the 
rancher. The rancher first sought foreclosure of the trust deeds which would clear 
title. Then the rancher discovered that serious error in the preparation of the 
earnest money agreement prevented the parties from ever having reached a valid 
and enforceable agreement. The rancher amended the complaint to seek 
rescission and cancellation of the documents based on the buyer's abandonment 
of the transaction and based on the essential errors in the written agreement 
which meant the parties had failed to reach an agreement "in law". The count for 
foreclosure was retained in the amended complaint, only in the alternative. 
Disposition at Trial 
At trial, judgment was awarded to the plaintiff, cancelling the documents of 
record and restoring clear title to his ranch to him. The Court did not refund 
$10,000.00 the buyer had placed as earnest money and an additional $3,326.00 
the buyer had expended for grazing fees, finding that the buyer's "abandonment 
dictates that he forfeit claim to sums paid over, and he has waived and is stopped 
from such claims". Conclusion of Law % 6, Record (R.) 674. 
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The court further declined to award the real estate broker (United Farm and 
Rex), who was plead into the action, any commission over and above the down 
payment money the broker had retained, finding that the broker was "entitled to 
retain funds received on a quantum meruit basis." Concjusion of Law f 10, R. 
675. 
Appeal was taken from this decision by the broker and the reneging buyer. 
Motion in Supreme Court 
As soon as the appeal and cross-appeal were taken, the plaintiff 
responded and filed a motion to dismiss the appeals. The grounds for dismissal 
of the principal appeal are not at issue here, but the grounds for dismissal of the 
cross-appeal are pertinent. The cross-appeal was sought to be dismissed 
because the notice of cross-appeal was filed in an untimely manner. A purported 
"Joinder of Cross Appeal" was filed even later. This Court denied the preliminary 
motion to dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal. 
Disposition in Court of Appeals 
This case was transferred to the newly formed Court of Appeals for 
disposition on the merits. That court heard arguments and issued an opinion 
dated August 25,1987, reported at 64 UAR 42. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
decision of the trial court in rescinding and cancelling tjhe agreements between 
the parties. However, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment (and impliedly 
the factual conclusions) of the trial court in directing entry of judgment against 
Plaintiff-Seller-Petitioner for restitution of the earnest money and grazing fee and 
judgment for the balance due on the commission. 
Plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing, pointing out to the Court of Appeals 
the obvious jurisdictional defect in the cross-appeal. The cross-aooellant raised 
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as its principal defense to the jurisdictional deficiencies that the Supreme Court, 
in declining to dismiss the cross-appea! previously on motion, had thereby 
established the "law of the case" even though that motion for dismissal was 
preliminary and coupled with another motion to dismiss the main appeal, which 
was also denied. 
The petition for rehearing was denied by an Order Denying Petition For 
Rehearing and Petition For Remittitur1 dated October 6, 1987. 
1
 The Petition for Remittitur was sought by the purchaser McQuarrie who claimed he should 
not have been required to wait for entry of his new judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CROSS-APPEAL WAS JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTIVE 
Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have ignored the jurisdictional^ 
defective filing of the Cross-Appeal. This issue was raised by motion in this Court 
and brief in the Court of Appeals, but it has never been the subject of an order 
explaining why the late filed Cross-Appeal was not found to be defective. 
A brief chronology will evidence the fatal defect in the cross-appeal. 
May 8,1984. Judgment in favor of Plaintiff was entered. 
June 6,1984. Appellant, L Gurr McQuarrie, filed a Notice of Appeal. 
July 9,1984. Appellant filed, untimely, his Designation of Record on 
Appeal. 
August 6,1984. United Farm Agency filed a cross-anoeal and statement of 
points. 
August 29, 1984. Cross-Appellant John M. Rex (hereinafter Rex) purported 
to 'join' the late cross-appeal by filing a "Notice of Joinder of 
Cross-Appeal". 
October 12,1984. Langston (Respondent and Cross Respondent) filed a 
motion and memorandum seeking dismissal of the appeal as 
well as the cross-appeal of United Farm Agency and 
dismissal of the joinder in that cross-appeal by Rex. 
November 4, 1984. A hearing was held before the Utah Supreme Court on 
the motion to dismiss the appeal, the cross-appeal and 
joinder in the cross-appeal. Plaintiffs motion was denied. 
Rules 74(b) and 75(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, required a Cross-
Appeal to be filed within ten (10) days after the service and filing of Appellant 
McQuarrie's Designation of Record on Appeal. United farm Agency did not file 
its Cross-Appeal and Statement of Points within that time. Rather, the cross-
appeal was filed on August 6,1984, which/even if the untimely Designation of 
Record which was filed by Appellant McQuarrie were deemed viable, was 
approximately eighteen (18) days beyond the requisite ten (10) day period. 
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By filing a Notice of Joinder of Cross-Appeal on August 29, 1984, and 
purporting to 'join' the late Cross-Appeal, Rex too failed to meet the jurisdictional 
filing requirements of the Rules. Even assuming such a thing as a 'joinder* of 
appeal exists, Rex can claim no greater position with respect to the status of his 
appeal than that occupied by United Farm Agency. Further, Rex failed to file any 
brief on appeal. 
The failure to file a Cross-Appeal in a timely manner compels the dismissal 
of such Cross-Appeal. In Terry v. Zions Co-Op. Mercantile Institution. 617 P.2d 
700 (Utah 1980), the court acknowledged the invalidating effect of untimeliness 
upon a cross-appeal: 
"From the just-quoted rules [Rules 74(b) and 75(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure], it could hardly be clearer that if a respondent desires to 
attack the judgment and change it in his favor, he must timely file a cross-
appeal which plainly states the propositions he intends to rely on as 
entitling him to relief." [emphasis added] 
Id. at 701. See also Cerritos Trucking Company v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 
608, 613 (Utah 1982). 
While there is no Utah case squarely holding that failure to timely file a 
cross appeal is a jurisdictional defect, it is clear that untimely filing of a notice of 
appeal in Utah is jurisdictional. See Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1982). Further, other jurisdictions operating under similar rules of procedure hold 
that failure to timely file a cross appeal is a defect of jurisdictional dimension2.. 
Welsh v. Elevating Boats. Inc.. 698 F. 2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983)3; In re Interstate 
Agency. Inc.. Capitol Indemnity Corporation v. Interstate Agency. Inc.. 760 F. 2d 
121 (6th Cir. 1985). 
2
 It should be noted that these cases are decided under the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, after which the present Rule 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals are modeled. See Advisory Committee Note to Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, 
3
 A copy of this unpublished opinion obtained through Westlaw is included in the Appendix 
to this Petition. 
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In light of the above-stated facts and applicable law, this Court was without 
jurisdiction to hear any purported Cross-Appeal and shrkitf, therefore, have 
denied the relief requested. 
POINT ll. No PRIOR DECISION IN THE HISTORY OF THISJCOURT PERMITS THIS 
COURT TO ALLOW A JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE CROSS-APPEAL 
No prior decision of this Court allows a jurisdictionally defective appeal or 
cross-appeal. Further, this Court is not, nor should it b£, required to follow and 
uphold the earlier decision of this Court on the preliminary motion to dismiss that 
is clearly in error. 
The Court of Appeals declined to dismiss the Cross-Appeal on the strength 
of arguments from Cross Appellant's Reply to the Petition for Rehearing. 
On or about the 12th day of October, 1984, Robert Langston Ltd and 
Robert Langston, petitioners herein ("Langston"), filed a motion and 
memorandum seeking dismissal of the cross appeal of United Farm 
Agency ("U.F.A.") and dismissal of the joinder in that cross appeal by John 
Rex. 
United Farm Agency opposed the motion to dismiss its cross-appeal 
and a hearing on the motion was held on or about November 4,1984 
before the Supreme Court of Utah. After considering the pleadings of the 
parties and after receiving oral arguments from counsel, Langston's 
motions to dismiss the cross-appeal and to dismiss the joinder in the cross-
appeal were denied. 
The Supreme Court of Utah having already considered and ruled on 
the issue, United Farm Agency respectfully asks this Court not to 
reconsider this issue and to affirm the Supreme Court's decision. See 
Conder v. A. L Williams & Associated. Inc. 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals felt bound to allow this cross-
appeal by the decision of a panel from this Court on the preliminary motion. That 
earlier Motion to Dismiss the Cross Appeal was coupled with a Motion to Dismiss 
the main Appeal. Both motions were denied without comment or opinion by this 
Court. It was not the intent of this Court to thereby declare the validity of the Cross 
Appeal, but merely to deny the dismissal at that point to allow full briefing of all 
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issues in both appeals, and retain all parties before the Court for that purpose. 
Then the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals, which has given 
deference to this Court's decision on the motion, in spite of the clear law and facts 
that require dismissal of the Cross Appeal. 
The doctrine of 'the law of the case' does not require that all prior decisions 
in a case be followed. It is readily apparent that the stage at which a motion is 
considered has an effect on the disposition of the motion. The Court of Appeals 
felt bound by a decision of this Court on a preliminary motion,. It is fully within the 
power of this Court to dismiss a jurisdictionally defective cross appeal. In fact, it is 
the duty of this Court to dismiss a jurisdictionally defective cross appeal. 
The Court of Appeals may also have been reluctant to dismiss the Cross 
Appeal because there are no Utah authorities directly holding that the late filing of 
a Cross Appeal is fatal to the Cross Appeal. This is a situation which this Court 
may remedy by the granting of this petition and hearing this appeal. The opinion 
of this Court in this case will provide needed authority on two issues: 
1. The Court of Appeals, in rendering final decision on an appeal, 
need not give blind deference to a preliminary decision on a motion by this 
Court. 
2. The late filing of a Cross Appeal is fatal to a Cross Appeal. 
This Court will not find it necessary to reach the facts of the case in 
dismissing the Cross-Appeal. However, if the Court were to review the facts it 
would find the Court of Appeals committed manifest error in its actions or the 
cross-appeal. The Court of Appeals obviated the judgment entered by the trier of 
fact ignoring his findings after hearing the evidence. 
This Court should grant this Petitioner an order to clarify Utah Law on these 
important issues as well as to properly adjudicate the rights of these parties. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Robert Langston, Ltd., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Robert Langston, individually and 
as general partner of Robert 
Langston, Ltd., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
Security Title Co. of Southern 
Utah, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Before Judges Orme, Greenwood and Billingsi 
ORME, Judge: 
Appellant McQuarrie seeks reversal of the trial court's 
decision granting rescission of a contract for the sale of 
land leases, grazing permits, and cattle from respondent 
Langston to McQuarrie. McQuarrie also seeks reformation of 
the contract and specific performance of tfce reformed 
contract. United Farm Agency cross appeals, seeking a 
commission based on a listing agreement it had with Langston. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Nol. 860036-CA 
F I L E D 
AUG 2 5 1987 
i imothy M. Shsa 
Cierk o* me Court 
Utah Coun of Appeals 
We affirm Langston's judgment against McQuarrie with one 
modification and reverse the judgment of no cause of action 
entered against United Farm Agency. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 24, 1980, McQuarrie and Langston entered into 
a written contract for the sale of some or all of Langston's 
ranching operation known as the Last Chance Allotment. The 
"Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale" listed the property to 
be sold as certain Bureau of Land Management grazing permits, 
range worthy cattle at the prices per head stated in the 
agreement, and other items of personal property. The purchase 
price of $620,000 — $380,000 for the BLM permits and an 
estimated $240,000 for the cattle — was to be paid as 
follows: $10,000 as earnest money; $145,000 down payment due 
on April 15, 1980; and equal annual installment payments of 
$59,724 payable April 15, 1981 and yearly thereafter until the 
entire balance was paid in full. 
At the time the agreement was signed, the parties agreed 
that a cattle count would be conducted to determine the exact 
number of cattle on the ranch, which would enable a final 
price to be calculated for the cattle. Neither the fact of 
the cattle count nor the timing or mechanics for the procedure 
were included in the contract. Because of the inaccessibility 
of the Last Chance Allotment, the parties were unable to 
perform the cattle count until late May and early June of 1980. 
Many of the documents necessary to complete the sale, 
including quit claim deeds and trust deeds for the permits, 
were executed by the parties prior to the cattle count. All 
transactions necessary to finalize the sale were, apparently, 
complete upon the execution of these documents, with the 
important exceptions of the final cattle count, execution of a 
bill of sale for the cattle, and transfer of possession of the 
real and personal property subject to the contract. 
The cattle count began on May 23, 1980 and continued until 
June 9, 1980. McQuarrie's son Martin was present through most 
of the counting but left the ranch before the count was 
completed. Although written tally sheets were kept to reflect 
the total number of cattle,1 some of the green paint that 
was used to mark the cattle as they were counted rubbed off, 
and some of the cattle were counted twice. All parties 
stipulated at trial that the total number of cattle reflected 
1. Some of the original tally sheets were no more than ear 
tag numbers written in pencil on the back of used envelopes 
and other scraps of paper. 
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on the tally sheets equalled 246, despite Entries for more 
than 300, because of the double counting, ^he parties 
disagreed as to whether the tally sheets in evidence were all 
the tally sheets taken. 
In June 1980, McQuarrie visited the rknch and 
acknowledged that he did not have the $145,000 down payment 
then past due, but offered to pay $30,000. Langston did not 
accept the lesser amount. 
At about this time, McQuarrie began to suspect that 
Langston had continued removing cattle from the ranch after the 
earnest money agreement was executed. McQuarrie then 
repudiated the arrangement, sending the following note to 
Langston, through his broker: 
Please be informed that we are pulling out of the 
deal. Mr. Langston needs to tend his property. 
Appropriate refund of earnest money woulld be your only 
requirements 
Langston did not return the earnest money. Instead, he 
filed a lawsuit seeking judicial foreclosure of the trust 
deeds. McQuarrie counterclaimed for damages because of 
Langston*s failure to perform under the agreement and 
Langston's misrepresentations concerning the actual number and 
value of the cattle, the condition of the personal property, 
and the number of valid grazing leases held by Langston. 
McQuarrie also counterclaimed for specific performance of the 
sale agreement and requested the court to adjust the purchase 
price to reflect the value of property Langston was unable to 
deliver in accordance with the agreement. Langston later 
amended his complaint to state a claim for rescission.2 
2. McQuarrie argues that Langston elected the remedy of 
foreclosure, which barred Langston's later assertion of mutual 
mistake and claim for rescission. McQuarrije's argument is 
without merit. "The doctrine of election of remedies is a 
technical rule of procedure and its purpose is not to prevent 
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress for a 
single wrong.- Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 
P.2d 772, 778 (Utah 1983)(quoting Royal Resources, Inc. v. 
Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2d 793, 796 (Utah 1979)). 
Langston never sought double recovery; he r^ erely changed his 
legal theory and form of recovery. See, e.g., Earven ?. Smith, 
127 Ariz. 354, 621 P.2d 41, 43 (Ariz. App. 1980)(commencement 
of action on promissory note not conclusive of election of 
remedy and did not bar later claim of rescission on cattle 
contract) . McQuarrie himself has also asserted inconsistent 
theories, first seeking rescission of the Agreement through his 
letter, and then seeking specific performance in this action. 
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Three and one-half years after the action was commenced, 
trial was held. After hearing the evidence, the trial court 
declared the contract rescinded and, to return the parties to 
the status quo, declared the documents executed pursuant 
thereto void. (It did not, however, order restoration of 
McQuarrie's earnest money and certain grazing fees he had 
paid.) The court based its rescission of the contract 
primarily on a theory of mutual mistake. The trial court found 
that 285 cattle at prices shown for each type of cattle on the 
sale agreement were mutually assumed and that they were agreed 
to have a total approximate purchase price of $240,000.3 
"There was no anticipation by the parties that less than 285 
cattle would be present or counted, nor was there any 
anticipation that the money owing for cattle would vary, except 
in a slight degree, from $240,000." According to the court's 
findings, the parties were mutually mistaken as to the price 
and terms set by the contract. 
On appeal, McQuarrie argues that the court erred in 
granting rescission, and that the documents should be reformed 
to reflect the actual number and value of the cattle and then 
enforced. United Farm Agency cross appeals, seeking a 
commission based on a listing agreement between its agent John 
Rex and Langston. 
MUTUAL MISTAKE 
A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of 
contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or 
vital fact upon which they based their bargain. Bailev v. 
Ewinq, 105 Idaho 636, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Idaho App. 1983). 
The trial court found that the parties were mistaken as to the 
number of the cattle actually on the Last Chance Allotment 
(only 246 were shown by the exhibits) and also as to the price 
and terms. The crux of the mistake is this: If there had been 
285 cattle as Langston and McQuarrie both assumed, they could 
not have totalled $240,000 at the listed prices unless all 
3. Langston and McQuarrie testified that at the time of 
signing, they assumed there were approximately 285 cattle, but 
this number is not shown on the written agreement. However, 
the agreement provided for the sale of 285 BLM permits, and 
Langston could only run one cow per permit on the rang§. 
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but a handful of the cattle were bulls.4 There was also some 
confusion about what permits were being sold. The contract 
listed the BLM permits as being located in Garfield County. 
Unknown to the parties at the time of execution of the 
agreement, the state grazing lease in Garfield County had been 
cancelled in 1976. Langston had obtained, and was using in 
connection with the operation of the ranch, other leases which 
were not described in the sale agreement. The quit claim deeds 
Langston gave McQuarrie were for grazing leases in Kane and 
Garfield counties.5 
Mutual mistake of fact makes a contract voidable, see 
Tanner v. District Judges, 649 P.2d 5, 6 (Utah 1982), and is a 
basis for equitable rescission. Tarrant v. Monson, 619 P.2d 
1210, 1211 (Nev. 1980). We find the trial court was acting 
within its discretion to rescind the sale agreement in view 
4. The contract calls for the sale of four kinds of cattle at 
stated prices: yearling heifers at $450, cows with calves Mor 
coming with- calves at $750, dry cows at $500, and bulls at 
$1,000. 
5. All of the problems arising from this transaction could 
have been avoided by use of a detailed, clearly drafted sale 
agreement, instead of the short fill-in-the-blank form which 
was used. See Callister v. Millstream Assops., 60 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 43, 44 (Ct. App. 1987)(Use of short, general, 
fill-in-the-blank forms to govern expensive or complicated 
transactions is all but a guaranty of loopholes.). The parties 
could have allocated the risk of a substantially lower number 
of cattle, or at least made provisions for altering the total 
cost of the cattle or the individual prices, depending upon the 
essence of the contract. On appeal, Langston argues that the 
deal was to sell all the cattle — whatever was there -- for 
approximately $240,000. McQuarrie argues that the deal was to 
sell cattle at the listed prices, whatever the total cost might 
be. No such disparity of opinion would be possible if a 
suitable contract had been prepared. 
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of its adequately supported findings concerning mutual 
mistake.6 See 12A C.J.S. Cancellation of Instruments § 7 
(1980)(allowance or denial of rescission remedy rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court). See also Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1984). 
However, once the trial court rescinded the contract, it 
was, as it recognized, obligated to return the parties to their 
pre-contract position, if possible. Busch v, Nervik, 38 Wash. 
App. 541, 687 P.2d 872, 876 (1984). £e£ Perry v. Woodall, 20 
Utah 2d 399, 401, 438 P.2d 813, 815 (1968)(one electing to 
rescind a contract must tender back to other contracting party 
whatever property of value he has received); Horton v. Horton, 
695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984)("The purpose of an equity action 
is to restore the parties to the status quo to the extent 
possible."). Accordingly, to complete the restitution which 
properly accompanies rescission, Langston is required to 
reimburse McQuarrie for the $10,000 earnest money fee and the 
grazing fees McQuarrie paid. 
BROKER COMMISSION 
Under the terms of the exclusive listing agreement, Rex and 
United Farm Agency were entitled to a commission when: 1) a 
purchaser was procured at the stated price and terms, or 2) a 
purchase was procured at any other price and terms acceptable 
to the seller. Apparently relying on its analysis that mutual 
mistake warranted rescission of the contract, the trial court 
concluded that no purchaser was found within the terms of the 
listing agreement. This analysis confuses Langston's 
contractual obligations to McQuarrie, the buyer, with 
Langston's separate contractual obligations to the real estate 
agency. 
The general rule accepted in Utah is that a broker has 
earned his commission upon the procuring of a buyer who is 
ready, willing and able and who is accepted by the seller. 
6. At oral argument, attention was given to whether the 
written contract was ambiguous so as to permit the trial 
court's foray into the realm of extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985); Seashore's, 
Inc. v. Hangey, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. 54 (Ct. App. 1987). "That 
focus was misplaced since extrinsic evidence was considered not 
to divine the contractual intent of the parties, but rather to 
show the existence of mutual mistake. ?ee, e_*.g_*_# Bailev v. 
Ewinq, 105 Idaho 636, 671 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Idaho App. 
1983)(extrinsic evidence properly admitted to prove mutual 
mistake on the part of the pastier,). 
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1983). Assent a contractual provision which conditions the 
right tc a ^ commission on the performance or part performance of 
the buyer,7 the broker is not an insurer of the subsequent 
performance of the contract and is not deprived of his right to 
a commission by the failure or refusal of the buyer to 
perform. Id. See, e.g.i F.M.A. Financial Corp, v. Building, 
Inc., :~ L'tah 2d 80, 83-84, 404 P.2d 670, 672 (1965)(broker 
cannot be held as insurer against the possibility that the 
buyer may become dissatisfied with his bargain and bring a 
lawsuit claiming ^he right of rescission). In the present 
case, Rex, a United Farm agent, procured in McQuarrie a 
purchaser who, at that time, was ready, willing, and able. 
McQuarrie signed a sale agreement with Langston. He paid 
$10,000 towards his purchase obligation. He executed documents 
and initially participated in the cattle count. If he could 
secure reformation of the contract, he w.?uld still :iks to have 
ihe contract performed. 
The trial court found that £ex, although inexperienced as a 
real estate agent, was not negligent and was not guilty of bad 
faith or breach of trust.8 United Farm Agency was likewise 
found to be without fault. Once the agency met its obligation 
under the exclusive listing agreement, it is irrelevant that 
McQuarrie later failed to complete his payment obligation or 
that the sale agreement was rescinded years later. The listing 
7. In this case, no such language was included. The language 
of the listing agreement parroted the language of Bushnell. 
Paragraph B of the agreement provides: "You are employed on ,= : 
exclusive basis to procure a purchaser, ready, willing and afcl=: 
to buy said property at the price and upon terms as stated 
herein or as otherwise subsequently authorized by me, and t •: 
accept and give receipt for any money or deposits receiver 
connection with ihe if ^  1 e c: s ~ ~ 1 property." 
•: . Vnle such a finding, •<, t 1.- a s t as tz negligence, is 
certainly questionable in view of Rex s apparent role in tV; 
preparation of the grossly deficient sale contract, it is not 
challenged on this appeal by Langsten. 
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agreement entitles Rex and United Farm to a commission of 
$38,000.9 Rex and United Farm have already received a 
portion of the commission due from the initial earnest money, 
which should be subtracted from the amount due. 
The court's basic disposition as between Langston and 
McQuarrie is affirmed, with remand for the entry of judgment in 
favor of McQuarrie in the amount of the earnest money and the 
grazing fees. The court's judgment as between Langston and 
Rex/United Farm is reversed, with remand for the entry of 
judgment against Langston in the amount indicated. All parties 
shall bear their own costs of appeal and cross-appeal. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
9. The listing agreement provided for a 10% commission on the 
sale price of the land leases and grazing permits, a total of 
$380,000. There was no mention of the cattle in the listing 
agreement and accordingly no commission was earned on the 
failed cattle sale. 
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~;;TRT uF APPEALS 
Rcbert Langst^n, Ltd., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
R\:rr McQuarrie, 
Defendant an-^ Ar~eIIant, 
• O O U G v 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING AND PETITION 
FOR REMITTITUR 
Robert Lancston, individually 
and as general partner of 
Robert Langston, Ltd./ et ai.# 
Defendants and Respondents, 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, 
Thi re-Party Rialntiff, 
v. 
Secui 
Utah, 
ithern C a s e N _ ?6 0 0 3 6 =~Ci 
THIS MATTER having come :,-:-: jie ii.o' ""cut -ir-r> Defendants/ 
R ~o r --r.-f-n- - * Petitirn fsr Rehearing and the Appellant's Petition tor 
Se.T.i:ti;jr in t.ne ~;_ . ..:.-:••--? --ifter, and the Court having duly 
considered s^id petitions, 
.• ur--v-v ORDERED that the Defendants/Respondents' 
Petition for Rehearing »>. o-nivn. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant's Petition for 
Remittitur be denied. This matter is to be remitted 30 days 
following the entry of this order. 
Dated this 6th day of October, 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
-2-
CHRTIFI CATION: 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of October, 1937, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND PETITION FOR REMITTITUR was railed : r persrnally deli%ered t_o 
each of the abzve parties. 
Karen Bean 
Case Management Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
CASE TITLE: 
Robert Langston, Ltd., 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
v. 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
v. No. 860036-CA 
Robert Langston, individually and as 
general partner of Robert Langston, 
Ltd., et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
PARTIES: 
James A. Mclntyre, Esq. (McQuarrie) 
Mclntyre & Dennis, P.C. 
6775 South 900 East 
P.O. Box 7280 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107-0280 
Kevin J. Sutterfield, Esq. (United Farm) 
Beneficial Life Tower #1800 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David Nuffer, Esq. (Langston) 
Snow & Nuffer 
P.O. Box 386 
St. George, UT 84770-0386 
Bryce Roe, Esq. (Security Title Co.) 
Fabian & Clendinen 
215 South State, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Timothy B. Anderson, Esq. (John Rex) 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
One South Main 
St. George, UT 84770-0386 
D. David Lambert, Esq. (United Farm) 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, UT 84603 
DAVID NUF7ER 
SNOW & NUFFER i^-.-^ r I ~. PZCCVvDJ 
A F r c f e s s icna 1 C. r : ; ra r ion -£-UL'j£..^ . : 9 <£L. 
F . O . Bex 2 5 e ^OX-^iyiiJ _CCCi 'ufrrm 
St. George, Utah £-77 0-03 86 C-rL
 0.' •;" - •' ••->r>._» 
(SGI) 62S-2611 " '""' '= • 
IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT LANGSTON, LTD., ) 
Plaintiff, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs- ) 
L. GURR McQUARRIE, ) 
Defendant ~r.d ) 
) 
Counterclaim 
) 
RC5E77 LANGSTCN, ir.cividi. ^  I v 
and as general par'.r.er cf ) Civil No. 1690 
ROBERT LANGSTON, LTD.. JC:-:N ::. 
REX, arc UNITED FAR?- *-~~\'~" ) 
Counterclaim ) 
Defendants. 
) 
L. GURR McQUARRIE. 
) 
Third-Fartv 
Plaintiff,' ) 
) 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF ) 
SOUTHERN UTAH. 
) 
Third-Party 
Defendant. ) 
This matter cane on for trial before the 
aheve-ertitled Court, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
['?-"-: 1 
(c £?€ 
presiding, on the 15th day of March, 1984, pursuant to 
notice duly given, said trial continuing until the 16th day 
of March, 1984. Present were Plaintiff, Robert Langston, 
Ltd., through its general partner, Robert Langston, who is 
also a Counterclaim Defendant, and their counsel, David 
Nuffer, of Snow & Nuffer; Defendant L. Gurr McQuarrie and 
counsel Jar.es A. Mclntyre and Leland Dennis, of Mclntyre, 
Dennis & Eagan; Defendant John M. Rex and counsel Timothy B. 
Anderson of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; United Farm 
Agency through counsel David Lambert, of Howard Lewis & 
Peterson. 
The Court heard the opening statements of counsel, 
received exhibits and heard witnesses and heard the closing 
arguments of counsel. 
Claims involving Security Title Company were 
severed from this proceeding by a prior Order of the Court 
and will be heard and determined later. At the outset of 
trial the Court determined that all claims save and except 
for the accounting (in the event foreclosure were granted) 
would be heard together at the outset of the proceedings. 
In the event foreclosure were granted, evidence regarding 
accounting for the possession and use of the property by the 
trust deed beneficiary Robert Langston, Ltd., was to be 
heard following the introduction of all evidence on other 
matters. 
At the close of the first phase of the trial, the 
Court made the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law which render further proceedings in the accounting 
matter unnecessary. 
The Court finds that entry of a final judgment as 
to fewer than all claims and parties is proper, as there is 
no just reason for delay, and expressly determines and 
directs that judgment pursuant to the Findings and 
Conclusions shall be entered at this time. 
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EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, hydrocarbons, 
and other minerals, in, on or under said land 
together with the right of ingress and egress for 
the purpcse of exploring and/or removing the same. 
State of Utah, State Land Board, Grazing Leases 
App. No's. 18540, 18542, 18844, 20763 and 21012 
which encumber the following described real 
property in Kane County: 
The North half of Section 36, Township 38 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; all of 
Section 2, and 32, Township 39 South, Range 4 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the East half 
of Section 36, Township 40 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and all of Sections 
16, 32, and 36, Township 40 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The Southeast quarter of Section 2, Township 38 
South, Range 3 East; all of Section 32, Township 
38 South, Range 4 East; the East half of Section 
16, Townshir 39 South, Range 4 East; and all of 
Section 16, Township 41 South, Range 4, East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, 
The South half of Section 36, Township 38 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the 
Vest half of Section 16, Township 38 South, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and the East 
half of Section 16, Township 38 South, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, hydrocarbons and 
other minerals in, on or under said land, together 
with the right of ingress and egress for the 
purpose of exploring and/or removing the same. 
TOGETHER WITH 285 BLM PERMITS within the last 
chance allotment totalling 3090 AUMS active and 
2066 AUMS suspended. 
At times, other land has been involved in the cattle 
operation, and the BLM permits have generally increased 
over time. 
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 t > „ r n. - . , ^  . . ..angstcn, Ltd., 
have also c i e i ^ e : ; -"ittle ::er::i.-" ~: -. similar nati jre 
but f a 5i3 1 !e: scope do: :j6ri:.;c Ic^;cd in Mohave 
County, Ari:or:a, which : <* r. t ;::; v . -• L" rived in this 
8. In the Fall of 19 7 q ( Robert J. Langs ton 
exec tec the listing a^reenen: ~arkec as ixhibit 5- engaging 
T ^ v - v r - • - — -* * * - . * ^ - -* " - - i— * -> - vs - . . •- - ; *« - -, - , — - v - - -. -— <£"-*-*-
t h e rar .oh : r : : e r : y a t ^ t o t - . I t r i c e ; : : 2 5 J , O C C . C C . ^ i t h a 
~ r t , . r -i v. r e t h e r ^ c r t r e ~ : l e t t r i ' i b . 
.7 • •_*.«" - -d - . •- i . -I .. . - •_ d • ^ c - -» .. c ^ . . c C ^ d i d L ' A . C d i - i— 
r» c r. - s e v e r a c ~ a a t e t c e e j c i u as a - r 11 , i r ^ t t n t * c l i s t i n g 
a g r e t i t e n t t a i-. oen t_angs tc n r-„r: d iTr,: 11^ r c :T. Ageon;y r e 11*i r e d 
c t i y cc L.* e g r au i r i g i t i r e i s -.",c *dtG ^ 6 C S C 5 afiG u i u n o t 
A -- * 0 , - c , •-' :r - l i f e *-• * L . . cr v_ a L . ^ t: . 
T~* * . . . -~ .. 
- o::u • - '• " t: v. ~ tr ve r a , . i r ** s v i •_ r r r e : * - , _ - t g s t : o - o ; 
v . s i r c - : :v=- rar^Ur i r o p j ^ r o . ~ *" " e ^ ^ t t*~ L C : .- ? : • ^^ . " e 
t o r a n e x t e n 0 e o p e r t o c o 1 a •-; e e K ;<; ^ c d - v s , 
II. ~ ~ ''ate I 9 ~ 9 , M a r i i .. ~ M:'Iu = :r;6 son •. .re 
-"-^ .'^ -.:. . . ,-.- ^  * ••'- ^ Ldir.i vL..^c=^wt- w o. ... rex rt^r^i,:^ 
t~e possibilicy r: r:rchasi"g :he ranch, having been 
notified .f ; ?s •->. i s tt iv e through advert i seinent by United 
Farr Agency. 
— . -> trier arrangement, Martin T, KcQuarrie and 
John M, :-rx toured rve ranch on or dtout January 1, l^S^ 
*3 '. ue :i-.h ;oy of February, 1980, Robert J. 
Langston, John V. :--_-- Deanne Rex, wife of Defendant Rex , I,. 
Gurr MoQuarrie, his vife, and Martin F. McQuarrie ret in the 
or lice oi United Fanr. Agency In ft. George, Utah, and 
executed Plaintirf's Fxhibit a. i^loyd Phillips was present 
* ." - c - * this Deeting. 
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Antecedent to the execution of Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1, the parties discussed and mutually agreed that they were 
entering irto a sale of BLM permits and State Grazing Leases 
located in Kane and Garfield counties, with 285 cattle, at a 
total cost of $620,000.00. $380,000.00 of the total 
purchase price was allocated to the land while $240,000.00 
of the total purchase was allocated to the cattle. The 285 
cattle, at prices shown for each type of cattle on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 were assumed and agreed by all present 
tc have a total purchase price of $240,000.00. This 
agreement assumed a count of cattle would be made, before 
arriving at an exact dollar amount for the cattle. There 
was no anticipation by the parties that less than 285 cattle 
would be present or counted, nor was there any anticipation 
that the money owing for cattle would vary, except in a 
slight degree, from $240,000.00. 
14. The payment of $620,000.00 was mutually 
agreed to be accomplished by the transfer of: 
a. $ 10,000.00 earnest money 
b. $145,000.00 downpayment due April 15, 1980 
c. equal annual payments of $59,724.60 payable 
April 15, 1981, and yearly thereafter, until 
the entire balance including principal and 
interest at the rate of 9Z per annum was paid 
in full. 
15. On February 24, 1980, the Defendant L. Gurr 
McQuarrie contemplated that one method of obtaining the 
downpayment of $145,000.00 would be assumption of an 
obligation in the amount of $145,000.00 due from Robert J. 
Langston or Robert Langston, Ltd., to the Utah Production 
Credit Association. 
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G>(rS 
. 0 J 0 ^  ' 
V35 Id-r^r ci - ::::•.: ed :: V::ted 5-IT: A,'tr.:y, d;r: " -ex ^;d 
5eci:ritv ~~i^:e 2 i:Giv' ":* o earnest r^r.ey iepzstt '-^ nt-\er 
L:bert J, Langstcn and L, Curr McQuarrie *ad 
no direct .:\-perscn ca.tacts free February 2£ , 1980, through 
the end of %M;v * r beginning of June, 19£0 . 
-:. i:. this tin.o period, February 2-, 1^80, 
through May or Jure, 19S0, Martin P. McQuarrie sen of L. 
Gurr McQuarrie came to work on the Langs ton ranch, Mr. 
Martin P McQuarrie has betn fully compensate; for fhec<f" 
services rendered, 
2°, During this tice period the parlies .^ll^r 
and purchaser had indirect contact through John Rex, 
2 0. "n A p r i 1 n , 1 c ° n Robert T. Langstcn e x e j L !. t c 
closing documents in this M'ansactiun prepare: by Security 
Title Corpanv ar.c received as Plaintiff's Exhibits 6. ^f £ , 
l). 1 CM 11, V , ;? and 1^. Execution of said documents 
occurred at the office of Security Title Company, St. 
George, Utah. 
:i. On April 8, i960, John M, Rex took the 
documents Exhibits 2-1*4 to Salt Lake City where they were 
reviewed by Defendant L. Gurr McQuarrie and executed by him. 
22. Following the execution of those documents by 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, John M. Rex returned the documents to St. 
George, Utah, where they were notarized by Lloyd Phillips, 
in officer and p^plnypp of "• '• -*-•- Crrnanv. 
v ^ J 1 V 1 J 
13. The quit claim deeds azd trust deeds were 
thereupon recorded and the other docur.er.is were placed in 
escrow. The quit-claim deeds were recorded at Book 261, 
Page 662, as Entry No. 150406, Records of Garfield Countv 
Utah, and Sock 065, Page 281, as Entry Kc. 40897, records o: 
Kane County, Utah. The trust deeds were recorded at Book 
261, Pages 663-665, as Entry No. 180407, Records of Garfiel< 
County, Utah, and Book 065, Pages 282-285, as Entry No. 
40898, Records cf Kane County, Utah. The transaction was 
therefore effectively closed with $10,000.00 down and 
documents were recorded affecting Langston1s title. 
24. At the time of the execution of all the abov< 
documents, Robert J. Langston and L. Gurr McQuarrie 
believed: 
a. That the total price for 285 cattle at the 
value per animal listed on the earnest money 
agreement was $240,000.00. 
b. That the ranch was located partially in 
Garfield and Kane counties, Utah. 
c. That Langston did not have the additional 
leases and acreage described in Exhibits 17 
and 18. 
25. A count of cattle was made through the perio< 
including late May and early June, 1980. Partial 
documentation of the cattle count appears as Exhibits 26, 
27, and 58. Portions of Exhibit 58 are duplications of 
Exhibits 26 and 27. The three referenced exhibits do not 
constitute the complete count of cattle made during the 
timer period in question. 
26. Over 300 cattle were counted and found on th< 
ranch in conformity with the agreement. Through the 
majority of this cattle count, Martin P. McQuarrie, as agen 
and representative of L. Gurr McQuarrie was present. 
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H c v e v e r , on the I as t v e e k e n d c f t he c o u n t , Ma r t ir i P , 
M c Q u a r r I e 1 e ft , I nte n d I n g to r e t u r n . V h i 1 e in Sa 11 L a ke 
C 1 1 v , h e w a s d i s c h a r g e d f r c m e m p 1 o y m e n t b y L . G u r r M c Q u a. r r i e 
and did not return to c o m p l e t e the count,, nor did any ether 
agent of L . Gurr M cQuarrie reti:rn to c o m p 1 ete the count. 
V h e n M a r t i n P. M c Q u a r r i e did not re turn, the real estate 
age nc y c o n t a c t e d the D e f e n d a nt L. Gurr McQ u a rri e a n d sa i d 
that no one ^as there . 1 Gi ir r K c Q u arrie indicated they 
s h o u l d p r o c e e d with the c o u n t . John M. Rex and Plain t i f f 
then went ahead and made the count. 
2 7 , Defendant mace paymen t fo r a BLM grazing tee 
i n 11 i e a m o u n t o f $ 3,329.96 a. n d f o r s a I t i n the approximate 
amount of $160,00 
2 8 . I h e D e f e: i d a i I t: L . G • : r r M c Q u a r r i e a r r i v e d o n 
the ranch in ear1y June , 1980 , and» in the presence of John 
M• Rex and Robert 1. 1 a.ngston , acknow 1 edged that he did not 
have the $145,000,00 dovnpayment then past due, and offered 
to pay $30,000,00 toward the installment already due from 
him: I Gurr McQuarrie either approved the cattle count or 
v a v i e d any o b j e c t i c n t here i: o . I f h e h a d b e e n ready t o 
perform., the cattle count would probably have been 
reconciled. 
29. Shortly thereafter. t;,e Defendant 1. Gurr 
McQuarrie telephoned John :•:". Rex ar.c informed him that ^e 
believed 
T - T r> c T~ '". r~ 
C--_x . ' c. 
E x h i b i t 
follews: 
[ 0 3 9 1 0 1 ] 
o <Z . - V. , c 
r l L . . C C i . 
\ e r z r i c e c 
C u u u * £ O t 
r „ ., c ^ _ 
i t ne - : c . 
us t i s e u u r e , 
c r
 r% i -
-x * 
r i t i u g ) n a r k e d as 
i i i l i r eads as 
Dear *!r. Rex: 
Please be informed that we are pulling out of the 
deal. Mr. Langston needs to tend his property. 
Appropriate refund of the earnest coney would be 
your only requirement. You signed and cashed that 
check so fast I wonder if the full meaning of the 
condition on it was understood. 
L. Gurr McQuarrie 
31. Physical possession of the land never passed 
to the Defendant and was never delivered by the Plaintiff, 
never having been requested by the Defendant. Necessary 
action tc perfect transfer of the leases was not undertaker.. 
The requisite documents to perfect transfer of the BLM 
permits or AUK's has not been undertaken and those still 
stand in the name of Robert J. Langston, 
32. Physical possession of the cattle and other 
personal property never passed to the Defendant, never 
having been requested by him. Necessary action to perfect 
transfer of the cattle was not undertaken. The escrow 
documents do not purport to convey the cattle until final 
payment under the contract. 
33. Langston has continuously been in possession 
of the land and cattle and possession has never changed. 
34. No further payments beyond the $10,000.00 
have been made by Defendant under the contract. 
35. The purchaser, Defendant L. Gurr McQuarrie 
did not follow through with his obligation and the seller 
remained and has always been in possession. 
36. All grazing or other fees and expenses of 
operation other than the BLM grazing fee and sale (See 
Findings J27) have been paid by the Plaintiff. 
37. A substantial period thereafter, after suit 
for foreclosure had been filed, the purchaser found errors 
in the cattle prices and that it was impossible for the 
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animals at the prices indicated to reach 5240,000.00, The 
Plaintiff was advised of this fact in late August, 1983. 
The allocated price per animal, given the standard mix of 
cattle then present on the ranch makes it impossible for the 
cattle price to reach $2-0,000.00. At most, the standard 
mix of cattle would equal about $190,000 in value. This 
price difference is material and critical to the essence of 
the agreement. Adjustment of this price difference would 
possibly affect both the dcvnpayment and payments over time 
and would affect the amount ultimately receivable by the 
Plaintiff, The parties' minds met on the price of 
$240,000.00 for the cattle, as is evidenced by the document 
Exhibit 1 and by the documents Exhibitjs 2-14. However, the 
parties were mutually mistaken as to the price and terms 
set. 
38. The parties1 agreement related to certain 
state leases and appurtenant BLM permits in Kane County and 
Garfield County, State of Utah. The parties1 minds met, 
assuming the legal descriptions of the documents contained 
in Exhibits 1-14, which was a mutual tiistake. Unknown to 
the parties at the time of the execution of Exhibits 1 and 
2-14 vas the fact that the state grazing lease, Exhibit 
19, on Garfield County property, had been cancelled on or 
about January 12, 1976. 
39. Also unknown to the parties was the fact that 
Plaintiff had procured and was using in connection with his 
BLM permits and in connection with the operation of the 
ranch subject to this transaction, two leases on half 
sections of land, Exhibits 17 and 18. 
40. The parties were mutually mistaken as to the 
existence of the Garfield County leas$ and were mutually 
mistaken as to the fact that all lease property was 
described in the transaction document^. 
19101] U 
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!*1 . Plaintiff after becoming aware of the errors 
in the leases and cattle calculations and of allegations of 
miscounting of cattle in August or September, 1983, moved to 
amend his Complaint. The Amended Complaint served as a 
notice of rescission and relates back to the inception of 
the transaction, 
42. John M. Rex went farther than normally would 
be expected in such transaction in attempting to carry out 
his responsibilities. John M. Rex sought advice from his 
broker and supervisor. 
The Court having made its Findings of Fact it now 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of 
this action and has personal jurisdiction of all parties 
hereto. 
2. The transaction was abandoned by Defendant L. 
Gurr KcQuarrie. He cannot now require performance at the 
hand of the Plaintiff, and has no claim for damages, since 
the parties agreements are cancelled. All sums heretofore 
paid over by him are forfeited and relinquished to the party 
receiving them. 
3. Due to this abandonment, the documents 
executed by the parties in this transaction are cancelled, 
which include: 
a. Deposit Receipt and Agreement to Sell dated 
February 2U , 1980. 
b. Quit Claim Deed dated April 7, 1980, (Exhibit 
6) conveying grazing leases in Kane County to L. Gurr 
McQuarrie, recorded as Entry No. 40897, at Book 061 V*p* 
281, en April 13, 1980, records of Kane County Reco- ' 
conveying the following described property 
[039101] 
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State of Utah, State Land Board, Grazing Leases 
App. No.'s 18540. 18542, 18344, 20763 and 21012 
which encumber the following described real 
property: 
The North half of Section 36, Township 38 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; all of 
Section 2, and 32, Township 39 South, Range 4 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the East half 
of Section 36, Township 40 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and all of Sections 
16, 32, and 36, Township 40 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
The Southeast quarter of Section 2, Township 38 
South, Range 3 East; all of Section 32, Township 
38 South, Range 4 East; the fiast half of Section 
16, Township 39 South, Range 4 East; and all of 
Section 16, Township 41 Soutlji, Range 4, East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
The South half of Section 36, Township 38 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the 
West half of Section 16, Township 38 South, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and the East 
half of Section 16, Township:38 South, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, hydrocarbons and 
other minerals in, on or under said land, together 
with the right of ingress and egress for the 
purpose of exploring and/or removing the same. 
c. Quit Claim Deed dated April 7, 1980, (Exhibit 
7) conveying a certain grazing lease in Garfield County to 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, recorded April 15, J1980, at Book 261, 
Page 662, as Entry No. 180406, of the records of Garfield 
County Recorder, conveying the following described property: 
State of Utah, State Land Bo^rd, Grazing Lease 
App. No. 20075 which encumbets the following 
described real property: 
Ail of Section 36, Township 37 South, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, hydrocarbons, 
and other minerals, in, on or under said land 
together with the right of ingress and egress for 
the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same. 
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d. Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents 
(Exhibit 3) dated April 15, 19SC , securing an indebtedness 
in the principal sum of S61CCCC.C0, recorded at Book 261, 
rages 663-665, as Entry No. 18C4C7, on April 15, 1980, 
records of Garfield County Recorder, encumbering the 
property described in Paragraph (c) above. 
e. Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents 
(Exhibit 2) dated April 15, 1980, securing an indebtedness 
in the principal sum of $610,000.00, recorded as Entry No. 
40898, at Ecok 065, pages 282-285, on April 15, 1980, 
records of Kane County Recorder, encumbering the property 
described in Paragraph (b) above. 
f. Note secured by Deed of Trust, dated April 
15, 1980, in the principal sun of $145,000.00. 
g. Note secured by Deed of Trust,dated April 15, 
1980, in the principal sua of $465,000.00. 
h. Escrow Agreement executed by Plaintiff and 
Defendant dated April 8, 1980. 
i. Seller's Escrow Statement signed by Plaintiff 
and Buyer's Escrow Statement signed by Defendant, dated 
h'arch 8, 1980. 
j. Escrow Instructions dated April 7, 1980, 
signed by Plaintiff and Defendant. 
k. Bill of Sale dated April 15, 1980, and 
executed by Plaintiff covering one horse, a dozer blade and 
certain brands and ear marks. 
1. Bill of Sale dated April 15, 1980, signed by 
Plaintiff covering a TD-24 International. 
m. Bill of Sale dated April 15, 1980, signed by 
Plaintiff covering a D6 Caterpiller. 
n. Bill of Sale dated April 15, 1980, executed by 
Plaintiff covering a Chevrolet. 
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-. Further, because of the mutual mistakes in 
the inception of the contract, the contracts, if not 
cancelled en the grounds above noted, Would necessarily be 
rescinded. Reformation is not possiblje because the Court 
cannot find a meeting of the minds on an alternative or 
antecedent agreement. 
5. The Defendants claim of fraud is dismissed, 
no cause of action, due to total lack of evidence, on all 
elements. The Court finds against Defendant on ail other 
pleadings, including reformation and damages. 
6. Plaintiff's claim for an accounting by John 
Rex and United Farm Agency, to compel them to restore funds 
they received to Defendant L. Gurr McQuarrie is moot and is 
denied, as is any right of L. Gurr McQjuarrie to restitution 
of the $3,329.96 paid for grazing fees and $160.00 paid for 
salt. Defendant L. Gurr McQuarrie abandoned this 
i 
transaction in the first instance, prior to anyonefs 
awareness of the right of rescission, due to mutual mistake, 
and his abandonment dictates that he forfeit claim to sums 
paid over, and he has waived and is estopped from such 
claims. 
7. No damages, fees or costs are awarded to 
Plaintiff, Defendant or any of the parties. 
8. John K. Rex, while inexperienced as a real 
estate agent, was not negligent and was not guilty of bad 
faith or breach of trust. United Farm Agency was likewise 
without fault. 
9. Under the terms of the document Exhibit 54, 
John M. Rex and United Farm Agency werje entitled to 
commission in two events: 
a. when a purchaser is proicured at the stated 
price and terms, or 
b. when a purchase is proctired at any other 
price and terms acceptable to seller. 
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i r 
X 0 No purchaser was found within the terns of 
the listing agreement, but Rex and United Farm Agency are 
entitled tc retain funds received on a quantum merit basis 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this ~?^ day of /j* \/ , 2984 
/?- H£ 
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DAVID NUFFER 
SNCW & NUFFER 
A Professional Corporation. 
Attcrr.evs for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 386 
St. George, Utah 8^770-0386 
(801) 628-161; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT CF FANE COUNTY, STATE CF UTAH 
ROBERT LANGSTON, LTD., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs -
L. GURR McQUARRIE, 
Defendant and 
Count ere la imar.t 
-vs-
ROBERT LANGSTON, individually 
and as general partner of ] 
ROBERT LANGSTON, LTD., JOHN 
M. REX, and UNITED FARM AGENCY. 
Counterclaim ] 
Defendants. 
L. GURR McQUARRIE, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs - ] 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY OF ] 
SOUTHERN UTAH, 
Third-Party 
Defendant. ) 
) JUDO:ENT 
) Civil No. 1690 
This matter came on for trial" before the 
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
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presiding, cr. the 15th day of March, 198- , pursuant to 
notice duly given, said trial continuing until the 16th day 
of March, 198-. Present were Plaintiff, Robert Langston 
Ltd. through its general partner, Robert Langston, who is 
also a Counterclaim Defendant, and their counsel, David 
Nuffer, of Snow & Nuffer; Defendant L. Gurr McQuarrie and 
counsel Janes A. Mclntyre and Leland Dennis, of Mclntyre, 
Dennis & Eagan; Defendant John M. Rex and counsel Timothy E. 
Anderson of Jones, Waldo, Kolbrook & McDcnough; United Farm 
Agency through counsel David Lambert, cf Howard Lewis & 
Peterson. 
The Court heard the opening statements of counsel, 
received exhibits and heard witnesses and heard the closing 
arguments of counsel. 
Claims involving Security Title Company were 
severed from this proceeding by a prior Order of the Court 
and will be heard and determined later. At the outset of 
trial the Court determined that the hearing of all claims 
save and except for the accounting (in the event foreclosure 
were granted) would be heard together at the outset of the 
proceedings. In the event foreclosure were granted, 
evidence regarding accounting for the possession and use of 
the property by the trust deed beneficiary Robert Langston, 
Ltd., was to be heard following the introduction of all 
evidence on other matters. 
At the close of the first phase of the trial, the 
Court made the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law which render further proceedings in the accounting 
matter unnecessary. 
The Court finds that entry of a final judgment as 
to fewer than all claims and parties is proper, as there is 
no just reason for delay, and expressly determines and 
directs that judgment pursuant to the Findings and 
Conclusions shall be entered at this time. 
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All tactions under adviserr.enlt are r e r e e c in tr .ese 
. eacmes 
The Court having entered ids Findings 
Conclusions of Lav, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
the contract of sale between Plaintiff and Defendant 
abandoned and the following described documents are 
cancelled: 
Deposit Receipt and Agreement to Sell 
1980. 
of Fact a: 
that 
ra s 
February 24
 9 
catea 
April 1980, (Exhibit Quit Claim Deed dated 
6) conveying grazing leases in Kane County to L. Gurr 
McQuarrie, recorded as Entry No. 40897, at Beck 061, Page 
281, on April 15, 1980, records of KAne County Recorder, 
conveying the following described property: 
State of Utah, State Land Board, Grazing Leases 
App. No.fs 18540, 18542, 1$844, 20763 and 21012 
which encumber the following described real 
property: 
The North half of Section $6, Township 38 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Ba$e and Meridian; all of 
Section 2, and 32, Township 39 South, Range 4 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the East half 
of Section 36, Township 40|South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridiap; and all of Sections 
16, 32, and 36, Township 40 South, Range 4 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridiap. 
The Southeast quarter of Sjection 2, Township 38 
South, Range 3 East; all of Section 32, Township 
38 South, Range 4 East; the East half of Section 
16, Township 39 South, Ranke 4 East; and all of 
Section 16, Township 41 Sofith, Range 4, East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
The South half of Section 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Ba! 
136, Township 38 South, 
se and Meridian; the 
Vest half of Section 16, Township 38 South, Range 
3 East, Salt Lake Base and! 
half of Section 16, Townsh 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
Meridian; and the East 
ip 38 South, Range 3 
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EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, hydrocarbcr.s and 
other minerals in, on or under said land, together 
with the right of ingress and egress for the 
purpose of exploring and/or removing the sar.e. 
c. Quit Clain Deed dated April 7, 1950, (Exhibit 
7) conveying a certain grazing lease in Garfield County to 
L. Gurr McQuarrie, recorded April 15, 1980, at Book 261, 
Page 662, as Entry No. 180406, of the records of Garfield 
County Recorder, conveying the following described property: 
State of Utah, State Land Board, Grazing Lease 
App. No. 20075 which encumbers the following 
described real property: 
All of Section 36, Township 37 South, Range 3 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas, hydrocarbons, 
and other minerals, in, on or under said land 
together with the right of ingress and egress for 
the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same. 
d. Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents 
(Exhibit 3) dated April 15, 1980, securing an indebtedness 
in the principal sum of $610,000.00, recorded at Eook 261, 
Pages 663-665, as Entry No. 180407, on April 15, 1980, 
records of Garfield County Recorder, encumbering the 
property described in Paragraph (c) above. 
e. Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents 
(Exhibit 2) dated April 15, 1980, securing an indebtedness 
in the principal sum of $610,000.00, recorded as Entry No. 
40898, at Book 065, pages 282-285, on April 15, 1980, 
records of Kane County Recorder, encumbering the property 
described in Paragraph (b) above. 
f. Note secured by Deed of Trust, dated April 
15, 1980, in the principal sum of $145,000.00. 
g. Note secured by Deed of Trust,dated April 15, 
1980, in the principal sum of $465,000.00. 
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h. Escrcw Agreer.er.t executed by Plaintiff and 
Zefer.iant dated April 8, 198C. 
i. Seller's Escrow Statement signed by Plaintiff 
and Buyer's Escrow Statement signed by Defendant, dated 
March 8, 1980. 
j. Escrcw Instructions dated April 7, 1980, 
signed by Plaintiff and Defendant. 
k. Bill of Sale dated April 15. 1980, and 
executed by Plaintiff covering one horse, a dozer blade and 
certain brands and ear narks. 
1. Bill of Sale dated April l|5, 1980, signed by 
Plaintiff covering a TD-24 International 
m. Bill of Sale dated April 1 
Plaintiff covering a D6 Caterpiller. 
n. Bill of Sale dated April 3J5, 1980, executed by 
Plaintiff covering a Chevrolet. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the documents above-listed, if not cancelled on grounds of 
abandonment, would necessarily be rescinded on grounds of 
mutual mistake on the inception. 
5, 1980, signed by 
D AND DECREED that 
suns of money 
ion as are in their 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDG 
all parties are entitled to retain such 
received in the course of this transact: 
possession.^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 thac 
.11 other claims stated (save and except for the claims 
\ainst Security Title Company) are dismissed with prejudice 
A on the merit and all parties hereto^ shall bear their own 
fees and costs. ^>|- U. 
ON PETITION FCR REHEARING 
(Unpublished Opinion, :ec^ rJber 27, 1982) 
Before R'JBIN, JOHNSON and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges. 
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge: 
In our prior unpublished opinion, 5th Cir., 596 F.2d 994, in this mar it ire 
personal injury action, we affirmed the ju dgr.br. t in plaintiff-appellee Welsh': 
favor tut dismissed as untimely his crcss-appjeal in which he asserted that th< 
district court, to which the case was tried w 
taxing inflation into account when awarding hi 
Fed.R.Arp.P. 4(a)(3), once a timely notice of 
COPR. .C) WEST 1987 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. SOVf. WORKS 
ithout a jury, had erred in net 
jim damages. According to 
appeal is filed by one party, 
698 F.2d 23C R 1 OF 1 ? M F 8 CTA5 
"any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date zn 
which the first notice of appeal was filed...." Judgment was entered on Jure 
30, 1981 and defendant-appellant Elevating Bo^ts, Inc. filed its timely notice 
of appeal on July 21, 1981. Because Welsh did not file his notice of appeal 
until August 6, sixteen instead of fourteen days after Elevating Boats filed 
its notice of appeal, we dismissed Welsh's cross-appeal as untimely. 
In his petition for rehearing, Welsh contend^ that his notice of appeal was 
timely filed because Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e) and Fed.R.App.P. 26(c) granted him thr<= 
extra days in which to file it. Finding that those Rules gave Welsh no 
extension, we deny his petition for rehearing^ (FN1) 
FN1. Elevating Boats, Inc. has not filed| a petition for rehearing. 
Welsh correctly states that Fed.R.App.P. 3{dj requires the clerk of the 
district court to mail a copy of the notice of appeal to counsel of record for 
each party. (FN2) The clerk did so in this c£se, and Welsh received from the 
clerk a copy of Elevating Boats, Inc.fs noticb of appeal on July 24. Laying 
out Fed.R.App.P. 26(c), which states, "Whenever a party is required or 
permitted to do an act within a prescribed peiriod after service of a paper upc 
him and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed 
period," Welsh alleges that the Rule extended his time to file his notice of 
COPR. (C) WEST 1987 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT sfORKS 
698 F.2d 230 R 1 OF 1 
appeal by three days. (FN3) 
P 3 OF 8 CTA5 
FN2. Specifically, Rule 3(d) states: "The clerk of the district court 
shall serve notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each partyj. ..." 
FN3. Welsh also cites Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(e), khich is essentially the same 
rule, worded slightly differently: I 
"Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take soce 
proceedings within a prescribed period aftjer the service of a notice or 
Citation Ran)c(R) Page;?) Database Mode 
698 F. 2d 230 R 1 OF 1 P 1 OF 8 CTA5 T 
Jessie WELSH, Plaintiff-Appellee Cress-Appellant, 
v. 
ELEVATING BOATS, INC., Defendant-Appellant Tross-Appeliee, 
v. 
LI3ERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., Intervener-Appellee. 
No. 31-3434. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Feb. 14, 1983. 
In maritime personal injury action, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana at New Orleans, Charles Schwartz, Jr., J., 
entered judgment in plaintiff's favor, and appeal and cross appeal were taken. 
The Court of Appeals, 696 F.2d 994, affirmed judgment and dismissed as untimely 
cress appeal, and plaintiff petitioned for rehearing. On rehearing, the Court 
of Appeals, Garwood, Circuit Judge, held that Federal Rule of Appellate 
procedure which provides that when every party is required or permitted to cio 
an act within a prescribed period after service of paper upon him and paper is 
served by mail, three days shall be added to prescribed period grants no 
extension to one filing notice of appeal or cross appeal. 
Petition denied. 
COPR. (C) WEST 1987 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WOPJKS 
698 F.2d 230 R 1 OF 1 P 2 OF 8 CTA5 T 
l70Bk669 
FEDERAL COURTS 
k. Commencement and running of time for filing; extension of time. 
C.A.La. 1983. 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure which provides that when every party is 
required or permitted to do an act within a prescribed period after service of 
paper upon him and paper is served by mail, three days shall be added to 
prescribed period grants no extension to one filing notice of appeal or cross 
appeal. F.R.A.P.Rule 26(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Welsh v. Elevating Boats, Inc. 
698 F.2d 230 
COPR. (C) WEST 1987 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
698 F.2d 230 R 1 OF 1 P 3 OF 8 CTA5 P 
Roy A. Raspanti, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellant cross-
appellee. 
Robert Layne Royer, Baton Rouge, La., Joseph J. Weigand, Jr., flouma, 
La., for Welsh. 
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, John 0. Charrier, Jr., 
New Orleans, La., for intervenor-appellee. 
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana. 
'excusable neglect or good cause," since the 19^9 arenchnent this is or.l\ 
e motion is filed not latjer than 33 days after the 
qotice of appeal was required t: 
in Lashley; nor can we ourse: 
ISee Reynolds. 
authorized if 
expiration of the tine within which the 
filed. Hence, we do not remand as we dici 
extend the time in these circumstances 
FN6. Our construction of Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(^) and Fed.R.App.P. 26(c) does 
leave these rules meaningless, as they apply to the many instances in w; 
the federal rules do provide that a partyf must act within a prescribed 
:?R. (C) WEST 1987 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVJr. WORKS 
698 F.2d 230 R 1 OF 1 P |3 OF 8 CTA5 P 
See, e.g., Fed.R.App.P. 
Fed.R.App.P. 31 (filing 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12 'servincr 
period after a notice or paper is served pn him, 
27 (filing responses in opposition to motions) ; 
appellee's brief and appellant's reply brief); 
defendant's answer); Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 (serving answers to 
interrogatories); Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 (serving answers to requests for 
admission) . 
Accordingly, Welsh's petition for rehearing is 
DENIED. 
2ND OF DOCUMENT 
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o t h e r paper upon him and the n o t i c e o r pape r i s served by tna i l , 3 days 
s h a l l be added t o t h e p r e s c r i b e d p e r i o d . " 
Because we a re concerned with t h e t i m i n g in an a p p e l l a t e p r o c e e d i n g r a t h e r 
t h a n a t t he d i s t r i c t l e v e l , we d e c i d e t h i s case on the b a s i s of 
Fed .R.App.P . 2 6 ( c ) . Compare F e d . R . C i v . P . 1 ("These r u l e s govern t he 
p r o c e d u r e in t he Uni ted S t a t e s d i s t r i c t c o u r t s in a l l s u i t s of a c i v i l 
n a t u r e . . . . " ) with Fed.R.App.P. 1 ("These r u l e s govern p r o c e d u r e in a p p e a l s 
t o Uni ted S t a t e s c o u r t s of appea l s from t h e United S t a t e s d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t s . . . . " ) . However, we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e same r e s u l t o b t a i n s whether t h e 
g o v e r n i n g r u l e i s Fed.R.App.P. 26(c) o r F e d . R . C i v . ? . 6 ( e ) . 
:C?R. (C) WEST 198"7 NO CLAIM TO CRIG. U .S . GOVT. WORKS 
638 F .2d 230 R 1 OF 1 P 6 OF 8 CTA5 P 
A s t r i c t c j * 8 a r i s o n of t h e l i t e r a l word ing of Fed.R.App.P. 26(c ) and 4(a) (3) 
shows t h a t 26(c) g r a n t s no ex tens ion t o one f i l i n g a no t i ce of a p p e a l . Rule 
26(c) g i v e s a p a r t y t h r e e e x t r a days t o pe r fo rm an ac t when t h e a c t i s t o t a k e 
p l a c e " w i t h i n a p r e s c r i b e d pe r iod a f t e r s e r v i c e of a paper upon h i m . . . . " 
(emphasis added) . Rule 4 ( a ) ( 3 ) , however, d o e s not r equ i re t h a t a p a r t y f i l e a 
c r o s s - a p p e a l w i th in 14 days a f t e r s e r v i c e on him of not ice of f i l i n g of t h e 
o r i g i n a l n o t i c e of a p p e a l . Ins tead , Rule 4 ( a ) ( 3 ) r e q u i r e s t h e c r o s s - a p p e l l a n t 
t o f i l e h i s n o t i c e " w i t h i n 14 days a f t e r t h e d a t e on which t h e f i r s t n o t i c e of 
a p p e a l was f i l e d . . . . " (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
Th i s Cour t has h e l d t h a t Fed.R.App.P. 26 (c ) and Fed.R.Civ .P . 6 (e ) do 
no t e x t e n d a p a r t y ' s t ime t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal. (FN4) when t h a t p a r t y ha s 
r e c e i v e d n o t i c e of t h e e n t r y of t he d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment i n t h e m a i l . 
Reynolds v . Hunt Oi l Co . , 643 F.2d 1042, 1043 (5th C i r . 1981) ; Lash l ey v . Ford 
Motor C o . , 518 F.2d 749 (5th Cir .1975) . (FN5) See a l s o Clements v . F l o r i d a 
Eas t Coas t Railway Company, 473 F.2d 668 ( 5 t h Cir .1973) (ho ld ing t h a t a l t h o u g h 
p a r t y r e c e i v e d o rder i n t h e mai l , F e d . R . C i v . P . 6(e) d id not e x t e n d p a r t y ' s t i m e 
t o comply wi th o rder which r equ i r ed p a r t y t o pay c o s t s "wi th in n i n e t y days from 
t h e d a t e h e r e o f . . . . " ) . The Court i n t h o s e c a s e s determined t h a t t h e l anguage 
of Fed .R.App.P . 26(c) and Fed .R.Civ .P . 6 (e ) does not apply b e c a u s e t h e p e r i o d 
w i t h i n which an a p p e a l i n g pa r t y must f i l e r u n s from "the e n t r y of t h e judgment" 
and no t from the s e r v i c e of the n o t i c e of t h e e n t r y . The r a t i o n a l e i s e q u a l l y 
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a p p l i c a b l e t o a p a r t y who i s f i l i n g a c r o s s - a p p e a l , s ince t h e Ru le s s t a t e t h a t 
t h e f o u r t e e n day p e r i o d i n which t h e c r o s s - a p p e a l must be f i l e d r u n s from " t h e 
d a t e on which t h e f i r s t n o t i c e of appea l was f i l e d " r a t h e r t h a n from t h e 
s e r v i c e of t h e n o t i c e . (FN6) Accord ing ly , we ho ld t h a t Fed .R.App.P . 26(c) d i d 
not e x t e n d t h e t ime i n which Welsh had t o f i l e h i s no t ice of a p p e a l . His 
c r e s s - a p p e a l was c o r r e c t l y d ismissed a s u n t i m e l y . 
FN4. See Fed.R.App.P. 4 ( a ) ( 1 ) . These c a s e s concerned t h e f i l i n g of an 
o r i g i n a l n o t i c e of appea l r a t h e r t h a n a c r o s s - a p p e a l . 
FN5. We note t h a t a l though Fed .R .App .P . 4 ( a ) ( 5 ) allows t h e t r i a l c o u r t , on 
mot ion , t o g r a n t an ex t ens ion of t h e t i m e t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appea l f o r 
